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Abstract In this paper, we propose two new ways for
efficient secure outsourcing the the decryption of key-
policy attribute based encryption (KP − ABE) with
energy efficiency. The first way base on an observation
about the permutation property of the access structure
of the attribute based encryption schemes. We propose
a high efficient way for outsourcing the decryption for
KP-ABE based on this observation, and it can be used
for mobile devices for its high efficiency, but it can on-
ly be used for the ABE schemes having tree-like access
structure and the self-enclosed system. The second way
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base on another observation that almost all the previous
work on outsourcing the decryption of KP−ABE cares
little about the ciphertext length. Almost all the previ-
ous schemes have linear length ciphertext with the at-
tributes or the policy. But we know that transferring so
long ciphertexts via wireless network for mobile phone
can easily run out the energy of the battery, which hesi-
tates the adaption of these solutions in actual scenarios.
Thus we propose another new scheme to outsource the
decryption of ABE but with constant-size ciphertexts,
which can achieve high energy efficiency. Furthermore,
we propose a new very efficient way to secure outsource
the decryptor’s secret key to the cloud, which cost only
one modular exponentiation. We roughly evaluate the
efficiency of our proposals and the results show that our
proposals are practical.
1 Introduction
In these days, cloud computation is a very hot research
topic for its promising properties of cheap management
cost for users, any where/any time access, and very s-
calable software and hard ware investigation. However,
before adapting cloud computation, data owners should
ensure their data shall be secure and well protected. At-
tribute based encryption is a very promising technique
to store data owner’s data for flexible secure access con-
trolling on the ciphertexts. However, attribute based
encryption is a public key primitive and use tools need-
ing huge computation cost like bilinear pairings. Thus
it is desired to outsource this huge cost to the cloud. In
this paper, we concentrate on one scenario of outsouring
for cloud computation: how to securely outsourcing the
decryption of attribute based encryption to the cloud,
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which has important application for mobile users. Con-
sider the following scenario:
“Data owner Alice outsource her data sets to the
cloud, before outsourcing her data to the cloud, she
first encrypt her data by using attribute based encryp-
tion such as KP-ABE and outsource the ciphertexts to
the cloud. Data user Bob want to use the data item-
s for which his credential can decrypt, but he is on a
vacation and can only use mobile phone. Thus if he de-
crypt the downloading ciphertexts directly, his mobile
phone can not implement this for the huge computation
load. Thus he needs some mechanism to outsouce the
decrypting to the cloud, this is called the mechanism of
outsourcing decryption of attribute based encryption
to the cloud. Another important issue is the length of
the ciphertexts, if the length is very long outsoucing
the ciphertexts to the cloud will cost lots of energy for
the mobile phone, which will sharply shorten the living
time of the mobile phone and this is intolerable. Thus
we also care about the length of ciphertexts when out-
sourcing the decryption of attribute based encryption
to the cloud.”
Here we review some previous work on this topic.
Green et al. [14] in 2011 proposed a very efficient way
for outsourcing decryption of attribute based encryp-
tion, which is a wonderful result for adapting ABE for
mobile equipments. However, this work care little about
the verifiability for the computation results, the cloud
can cheat the data users without any noticing. There-
fore, Lai et al. [15] proposed a new way to outsource
decryption of ABE with verifiability, but their scheme
is not very efficient. Li et al. [19] also proposed a way
to outsource encryption/key generation/decryption of
ABE with checkability, but their scheme need often in-
teraction with the PKG. Recently, Qin et al. [22] pro-
posed an very efficient way to outsource decryption of
ABE with verifiability.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose two new ways for efficien-
t secure outsourcing the the decryption of key-policy
attribute based encryption (KP − ABE) with energy
efficiency. The first way base on an observation about
the permutation property of the access structure of
the attribute based encryption schemes, that is, the se-
quence of attributes are tightly associated with the ac-
cess structure. If the sequence of attributes have been
permutated, the access structure should be changed
too. From the permutated sequence of attributes and
the changed access structure, the adversary can not eas-
ily deduce the original sequence of attributes and the o-
riginal access structure if there are many attributes like
100 ones in the access structure. We propose a high ef-
ficient way for outsourcing the decryption for KP-ABE
based on this observation, and it can be used for mo-
bile devices for its high efficiency, but it has its own
restriction: it can only be used for the ABE schemes
having tree-like access structure while not supporting
LSSS structure, and also it can only be used for self-
enclosed system. The second way base on another obser-
vation that almost all the previous work on outsourc-
ing the decryption of KP − ABE cares little about
the ciphertext length. Almost all the previous schemes
have linear length ciphertext with the attributes or the
policy. But we know that transferring so long cipher-
texts via wireless network for mobile phone can easily
run out the energy of the battery, which hesitates the
adaption of these solutions in actual scenarios. Thus we
propose another new scheme to outsource the decryp-
tion of ABE but with constant-size ciphertexts, which
can achieve high energy efficiency. Furthermore, we pro-
pose a new very efficient way to secure outsource the
decryptor’s secret key to the cloud, which cost only one
modular exponentiation. We roughly evaluate the ef-
ficiency of our proposals, compared with the pervious
work [14, 15, 19, 22] on outsourcing the decryption of
ABE, our work can achieve high energy efficiency for the
client’s mobile devices. Thus our proposals are practi-
cal. This paper is based on our previous work [28] but
with significant extension, concretely we add the first
proposal which is not considered in our previous work,
formally prove the security of the second proposal, and
evaluate the performance of the second proposal etc.
1.2 Related Work
In 2005, Sahai and Waters [23] first proposed the con-
cept of attribute based encryption and give a concrete
such construction, which is an extension of fuzzy iden-
tity based encryption they also first proposed. In 2006,
according to how to embed the access control in the
algorithm, Goyal et al. [13] categorized ABE as the key
policy ABE and the ciphertext policy ABE, and they
also gave the first concrete key policy ABE based on bi-
linear pairings, this scheme can be proved selective se-
cure in the standard model. Since then, many research
results have been achieved. Waters in 2009 [24]first pro-
posed the dual system encryption framework and lat-
er [16,18,20] use this technique to design several fully se-
cure ABE schemes. Recently, Attrapadung [1] give a in-
teresting framework to transform selective ABE to fully
secure ABE. Chase et al. in 2007 [5] proposed the con-
cept of ABE with multi-authority and [6, 17] continues
this line of research. Attrapadung et al. [2–4,25,26] pro-
posed serveral variants of ABE with interesting proper-
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ties such as dual-policy ABE, chosen ciphertext secure
ABE, constant size ciphertext ABE, they also discussed
some relationship about ABE and other primitives such
as conjunctive broadcast encryption and predicate en-
cryption etc. In 2012, Parno et al. [21]first consider
ABE’s application in secure verifiable outsourcing com-
putation. Garg et al. [10] first proposed the ABE scheme
which can support any access control structure which
can be expressed as circuits by using the multilinear
map, this work can resist the backward-and-shift at-
tack while construction on bilinear map can not. How-
ever, almost all the ABE scheme for circuits [12] can
only achieve selective security, which is not satisfying.
Recently, Garg et al. [11] proposed the first fully secure
ABE schemes for circuits and proved the construction’s
full security by relying on some novel interesting tech-
niques. In another line of research work, Chen et al.
[7–9] try to give high efficient ABE schemes with full se-
curity and there are serval notable research results have
been achieved. Recently, how to efficient outsource the
decryption of ABE has gained great attention and many
wonderful results have been achieved [14,15,19,22].
1.3 Organization
We organize our paper as the following. In section II,
we give the definition and security model for outsouced
attribute based encryption. In section III, we give our
first proposal, roughly analysis its security and give the
comparison results. In section IV, we give our second
proposal and its security proof, we also give a new way
for outsourcing the decryption key, finally we give the
performance and comparison results. In the last sec-
tion, we conclude our paper with many interesting open
problems.
2 Definition and Security Model
2.1 Definition
Let S represent a set of attributes, and A an accesss
tructure. For generality, we will define (Ienc, Ikey) as the
inputs to the encryption and key generation function re-
spectively. In a KP−ABE scheme (Ienc, Ikey) = (S,A)
while in a CP − ABE scheme (Ienc, Ikey) = (A,S). A
CP−ABE(KP−ABE) scheme with outsourcing func-
tionality consists of five algorithms:
1. Setup(λ,U). The setup algorithm takes security pa-
rameter and attribute universe description as input.
It outputs the public parameters PK and a master
key MK.
2. Encrypt(PK,M, Ienc). The encryption algorithm takes
as input the public parameters PK, a message M ,
and an access structure (resp. attribute set)I. It out-
puts the ciphertext CT .
3. KeyGenout(MK, Ikey). The key generation algorith-
m takes as input the master key MK and an at-
tribute set (resp. access structure) Ikey and outputs
a private key SK and a transformation key TK.
4. Transform(TK,CT ). The ciphertext transformation
algorithm takes as input a transformation key TK
for Ikey and a ciphertext CT that was encrypted un-
der Ienc. It outputs the partially decrypted cipher-
text CT ′ if S ∈ A and the error symbol ⊥ otherwise.
5. Decrypt(SK,CT ). The decryption algorithm takes
as input a private key SK for Ikey and a partially
decrypted key ciphertext CT ′ that was originally
encrypted under Ienc. It outputs the message M if
S ∈ A and the error symbol ⊥ otherwise.
2.2 Security Model
Definition 1 A CP−ABE or KP−ABE scheme with
outsourcing is selective CPA-secure (or selective secure
against chosen-plaintext attacks) if all polynomial time
adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the
below game.
The formal security game consists of the following
phases:
1. Init. A declares a set of encryption attribute S that
will be used to create the challenge ciphertext dur-
ing Challenge phase, submits S to the challenger.
2. Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and
gives the pubilc parameters to the adversary A.
3. Phase 1. The challenger initializes an empty table T ,
an empty set D and an integer j = 0. Proceeding
adaptively, the adversary can repeatedly make any
of the following queries:
• Creat(Ikey): The challenger sets j := j+1. It runs
the outsourced key generation algorithm on Ikey
to obtain the pair (SK, TK) and stores in table
T the entry (j, Ikey, SK, TK). It then returns to
the adversary the transformation key TK. Note:
Create can be repeatedly queried with the same
input.
• Corrupt(i): If there exists an i− th entry in table
T , then the challenger obtains the entry (i, Ikey, SK,
TK) and sets D := D ∪ {Ikey}. It then returns
to the adversary the private key SK. If no such
entry exists, then it returns ⊥.
4. Challenge. The adversary submits two messagesM0,M1.
In addition the adversary gives a value I∗enc such
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that for all Ikey ∈ D, fIkey , I∗enc) 6= 1. The chal-
lenger flips a random coin b, and encrypts Mb under
I∗enc. The resulting ciphertext CT
∗ is given to the
adversary.
5. Phase 2. Phase 1 is repeated with the restrictions
that the adversary cannot trivially obtain a private
key for the challenge ciphertext. That is, it can not
issue a Corrupt query that would result in a value
Ikey which satisfies f(Ikey, I
∗
enc) = 1 being added to
D.
6. Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ for b. The
adversarys advantage in this game is defined as |Pr[b′ =
b]− 1/2|.
3 The First Proposal
3.1 System model
R
etrieve data
Cloud 
Computing
Ciphertexts from attribute based 
encryption 
S
to
re
 d
at
a
Outsource decryption
Computation result
Self-enclosed system
Outsourced decryption key
Fig. 1: Outsourced attributed based encryption for self-
enclosed system
In this subsection, we describe the system model for
our proposal. Our first proposal is mainly aiming at re-
lieve the decryption overhead of mobile users for secure
access control system using attribute based encryption
in a self-enclosed setting. The self-enclosed system here
refers that the cloud can not access the information
flow in this system. In this self-enclosed system, there
are three roles: the data owners who upload their files to
the storage server using attribute based encryption, the
data users can scalable access these encrypted files by
using their secret keys if the attributes associated with
the ciphertext satisfying the access structure tree as-
sociated with their secret keys, and the storage servers
for storing the uploaded ciphertexts. Outside the self-
enclosed system, there exists another party named the
cloud service provider. The data users maybe use mo-
bile devices which shall greatly restrict their computa-
tion ability, thus it need to outsource the computation
work to the cloud, here we mainly focus on how to out-
source the decryption of ciphertexts for the mobile de-
vices. In this model, the cloud is a semi-trusted party,
which shall be interested to derive the private keys of
the data users, note here we do not consider the ver-
ifiability of the computation results, which is another
issue many other papers have solved.
3.2 Review of GPSW’S Key-Policy ABE
3.2.1 Access Tree
Ciphertexts are labeled with sets of attributes and pri-
vate keys are associated with access structures that con-
trol which ciphertexts a user is able to decrypt.
Access tree Γ . Let Γ be a tree representing an access
structure. Each non-leaf node of the tree represents a
threshold gate, described by its children and a threshold
value. If numx is the number of children of a node x and
kx is its threshold value, then 0 ≤ k ≤ numx. When
kx = 1, the threshold gate is an OR gate and when
kx = numx, it is an AND gate. Each leaf node x of the
tree is described by an attribute and a threshold value
kx = 1.
To facilitate working with the access trees, we define
a few functions. We denote the parent of the node x in
the tree by parent(x). The function att(x) is defined
only if x is a leaf node and denotes the attribute asso-
ciated with the leaf node x in the tree. The access tree
T also defines an ordering between the children of every
node, that is, the children of a node are numbered from
1 to num. The function index(x) returns such a num-
ber associated with the node x. Where the index values
are uniquely assigned to nodes in the access structure
for a given key in an arbitrary manner.
Satisfying an access tree. Let Γ be an access tree with
root r. Denote by Γx the subtree of Γ rooted at the node
x. Hence Γ is the same as Γr. If a set of attributes γ
satisfies the access tree Γx, we denote it as Γx(γ) = 1.
We compute Γx(γ) recursively as follows. If x is a non-
leaf node, evaluate Γ ′x(γ) for all children x
′ of node x.
Γx(γ) returns 1 if and only if at least kx children return
1. If x is a leaf node, then Γx(γ) returns 1 if and only
if att(x) ∈ γ.
3.2.2 GPSW Scheme
1. Setup: Let G1 be a bilinear group of prime order
p, and let g be a generator of G1. In addition, let
e : G1 ×G1 → G2 denote the bilinear map. We also
define the Lagrange coefficient ∆i,S for i ∈ Zp and
a set, S, of elements in Zp: ∆i,S(x) = Πj∈S,j 6=i
x−j
i−j .
Define the universe of attributes U = {1, 2, · · · , n}.
2. Key Generation(Γ ):
• For each attribute i ∈ U , choose random number
ti uniformly from Zp.
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• Choose random number y uniformly in Zp.
• The published public parameters PK is
T1 = g
t1 , · · · , T|U | = gt|U| , Y = gy
And the authority’s master key MK is:
(t1, · · · , t|U |, y)
• Then the authority generates a key that enables
the User to decrypt a message encrypted under
a set of attributes γ if and only if Γ (γ) = 1. The
algorithm proceeds as follows.
(a) Choose a polynomial qx for each node x (in-
cluding the leaves) in the tree T .These poly-
nomials are chosen in the following way in
a top-down manner, starting from the root
node r. For each node x in the tree, set
the degree dx of the polynomial qx to be
one less than the threshold value kx of that
node, that is, dx = kx − 1. Now, for the
root node r, set qr(0) = y and dr other
points of the polynomial qr randomly to de-
fine it completely. For any other node x, set
qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)) and choose dx
other points randomly to completely define
qx.
(b) Once the polynomials have been decided, for
each leaf node x, the authority give the fol-
lowing secret key to the user:
Dx = g
qx(0)
ti
where i = att(x).
3. Encryption(M,γ, PK): To encrypt a message M ∈
G2 under a set of attributes γ, choose a random
value r ∈ Zp and publish the ciphertext as:
E = (γ,E′ = Me(gr, Y ) = Me(g, g)ry,
{Ei = T ri (i ∈ γ)})
4. Decryption(E,D): We specify our decryption proce-
dure as a recursive algorithm.
• We first define a recursive algorithmDecryptNode(E,D, x)
that takes as input the ciphertext E, the private
key D (we assume the access tree Γ is embedded
in the private key), and a node x in the tree. It
outputs a group element of G2 or ⊥.
• Let i = att(x), if the node x is a leaf node then:
– If i ∈ γ,
Decrypt(E,D, x) = e(Dx, Ei)
= e(g
qx(0)
ti , grti) = e(q, q)rqx(0)
– Otherwise, return ⊥.
We now consider the recursive case when x is a
non-leaf node. The algorithmDecryptNode(E,D, x)
then proceeds as follows: For all nodes z that are
children of x, it calls DecryptNode(E,D, z) and
stores the output as Fz. Let Sx be an arbitrary
kx -sized set of child nodes z such that Fz 6=⊥.
If no such set exists then the node was not sat-
isfied and the function returns ⊥. Otherwise, we
compute
Fx =
∏
z∈Sx
F
δi,S′x (0)
z
=
∏
z∈Sx
(e(g, g)rqz(0))δi,S′x (0)
=
∏
z∈Sx
(e(g, g)rqparent(z)(index(z)))δi,S′x (0)
=
∏
z∈Sx
e(g, g)rqx(i)δi,S′x (0)
= e(g, g)rqx(0)
= e(g, g)ry
3.3 Main Idea
OR
AND
1 2 3
AND
OR
AND
4 5 6
Fig. 2: Original Access Structure I
Our proposal is based on the following observation:
The access structure is tightly associated with the
order of the leaf nodes. For example, in KP-ABE, the
ciphertexts are associated with the attribute sets, and
the policy is embedded in the private key of the users.
But the point is that the ciphertexts shoud have some
order, if we change the ciphertexts’ order, which mean-
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OR
AND
4 5
AND
OR
AND
2 1 36
Fig. 3: Permutated Access Structure II
OR
AND
4 5
AND
OR
AND
3 16 7
OR
2
Fig. 4: Permutated Access Structure III
s the ciphertext corresponding to the attribute are no
longer correct, the decryption result can no longer be
correct! CP-ABE also has this feature.
A more detailed description is the following:
In Fig.1, which is the original access structure I, and
the leaf nodes are {1, 2, · · · , 6}, and the order of them
is {1− 2− 3− 4− 5− 6}. In Fig.2, we permutated the
access structure, which denoted as II, the leaf nodes are
still {1, 2, · · · , 6}, but the order of them is {6− 4− 5−
2 − 3 − 1}. In Fig.3, we further permutated the access
structure II to get III, which has more difference. It has
more leaf nodes and gates, which hide the topology of
I. The leaf nodes are now {1, 2, · · · , 6, 7}, and the order
of them is {6− 4− 5− 3− 1− 2− 7}. To get the same
derived boolean value, leaf node 3 should have the same
boolean value with leaf node 7.
3.4 A Concrete Outsourced ABE Scheme
In this section, we give a concrete example to show how
the ABE scheme with permutated access structure II
works. Our scheme is based on the GPSW scheme [13]
(Note GPSW scheme has a threshold access structure,
but our Fig.1, 2, 3 all have the boolean formula struc-
ture. We emphasis this does not matter for OR gate can
be seen as 1-to-1 threshold access structure and AND
gate can be seen as a 2-to-1 threshold access structure.)
1. Setup: Let G1 be a bilinear group of prime order
p, and let g be a generator of G1. In addition, let
e : G1 ×G1 → G2 denote the bilinear map. We also
define the Lagrange coefficient ∆i,S for i ∈ Zp and
a set, S, of elements in Zp: ∆i,S(x) = Πj∈S,j 6=i
x−j
i−j .
Define the universe of attributes U = {1, 2, · · · , n}.
2. Key Generation(Γ )):
• For each attribute i ∈ U , choose random number
ti uniformly from Zp.
• Choose random number y uniformly in Zp.
• The published public parameters PK is
T1 = g
t1 , · · · , T|U | = gt|U| , Y = gy
And the authority’s master key MK is:
(t1, · · · , t|U |, y)
• Then the authority generates a key that enables
the User to decrypt a message encrypted under
a set of attributes γ if and only if Γ (γ) = 1. The
algorithm proceeds as follows.
(a) Choose a polynomial qx for each node x (in-
cluding the leaves) in the tree T .These poly-
nomials are chosen in the following way in
a top-down manner, starting from the root
node r. For each node x in the tree, set
the degree dx of the polynomial qx to be
one less than the threshold value kx of that
node, that is, dx = kx − 1. Now, for the
root node r, set qr(0) = y and dr other
points of the polynomial qr randomly to de-
fine it completely. For any other node x, set
qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)) and choose dx
other points randomly to completely define
qx.
(b) Once the polynomials have been decided, for
each leaf node x, the authority generates the
following keys:
Dx = g
qx(0)
ti
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where i = att(x).
Note here Γ = Access Structure I and should be
kept private by the decryptor.
3. Outsource KeyGen (D,Γ, P,Q) The decryptor first
permutes his access structure and the sequence of
the attributes, that is,
P (Access Structure I)
= Access Structure II
Q(Order of leaf nodes in I)
= Order of leaf nodes in II
Here P,Q denote the permutation of the access struc-
ture and permutation of the order of leaf nodes and
is kept secret by the decryptor. Furthermore the fol-
lowing condition should be satisfied:
Q(Order of leaf nodes in I)
satisfying
P (Access Structure I)
if and if
Order of leaf nodes in I
satisfying
Access Structure I
The data user’s outsourced decryption key will be
Doutsource = (Q(Dx, · · ·Dx′) = Q(g
qx(0)
t1 , · · · , g qx(0)tn ),
Access Structure II)
4. Encryption(M,γ, PK): To encrypt a message M ∈
G2 under a set of attributes γ, choose a random
value r ∈ Zp and compute:
E = (γ,
E′ = Me(gr, Y ) = Me(g, g)ry, {Ei = T ri (i ∈ γ)})
then the encrypter sends these ciphertexts to the
data user.
5. Outsource Ciphertext(E,Q): After obtaining the ci-
phertext E, the decryptor permutes E by using per-
mutation Q
Eoutsource = (Q(γ), Q({Ei = T ri (i ∈ γ)}))
and outsource them to the cloud.
6. Decryption(E′, D′): After obtaining (E′, D′), the cloud
runs the decryption algorithm as following:
• We first define a recursive algorithmDecryptNode
(E′, D′, x) that takes as input the ciphertext E′,
the private key D (we assume the access tree II
is embedded in the private key), and a node x in
the tree. It outputs a group element of G2 or ⊥.
• Let i = att(x), if the node x is a leaf node then:
– If i ∈ Q(γ),
Decrypt(Eoutsource, Doutsource, x) =
= e(g
qx(0)
ti , grti) = e(q, q)rqx(0)
– Otherwise, return ⊥.
We now consider the recursive case when x is a
non-leaf node. The algorithmDecryptNode(E′, D′,
x) then proceeds as follows: For all nodes z that
are children of x, it calls DecryptNode(E′, D′, z)
and stores the output as Fz. Let Sx be an arbi-
trary kx -sized set of child nodes z such that
Fz 6=⊥. If no such set exists then the node was
not satisfied and the function returns ⊥. Other-
wise, the cloud compute
Fx =
∏
z∈Sx
F
δi,S′x (0)
z
=
∏
z∈Sx
(e(g, g)rqz(0))δi,S′x (0)
=
∏
z∈Sx
(e(g, g)rqparent(z)(index(z)))δi,S′x (0)
=
∏
z∈Sx
e(g, g)rqx(i)δi,S′x (0)
= e(g, g)rqx(0)
= e(g, g)ry
and returns it to the user, the user then com-
putes
M =
E′
e(g, g)ry
=
Me(gr, Y )
e(g, g)ry
3.5 Security Analysis
Theorem 1 Our construction of outsourced attribute
based encryption is secure if the underlying permutation
of order of leaves and permutation of access structure
can not be inverted (e. g. number of the attributes is
very large like 100 and the access structure is complex
enough).
Proof Here we roughly analysis our proposal’s security.
For the malicious cloud, although it can get the permu-
tated secret key,
Doutsource = (Q(Dx, · · ·Dx′) = Q(g
qx(0)
t1 , · · · , g qx(0)tn ),
Access Structure II)
it can not know the concrete permutation, when the
attributes are large enough such as 100 ones, it need-
s to try 100! = 9.33 × 10157 times to knowing the
concrete permutation, which shall be too large for a
rational cloud service. But we also note our proposal
can only be secure in the self-enclosed system, that is,
the attributed based encryption ciphertexts can only
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be known by the data owners and data users, and can
not be accessed by the clouds. Otherwise, the malicious
cloud may derive the permutation from the original se-
quence of ciphertexts and the permutated sequence of
ciphertexts. We remark here such self-enclosed system
is very common in our real life, such as E-health infor-
mation system in hospital, which can be accessed by
Doctors and Patients, but can not be accessed by oth-
ers outside the hospital like the cloud service provider-
s. Although our proposal is not a perfect solution for
generic construction of outsourced attribute based en-
cryption, but it can find its application in many real
setting. Note here the mobile data users only need to
permutate his secret keys and keep the permutation
as the secret key, while all previous proposals for out-
sourced ABE at least require the data users to do a
modular exponential operation for outsourcing the de-
cryption key, thus our proposal is high efficient for the
data users.
3.6 Comparison
Table 1: Comparison Result
Proposals Method Assumption Efficiency
Previous Work Cryptographic Way Computation Intractable Problem Not very high
Our Permutation Combinatorial Intractable Problem High
Here we give a roughly comparison results with pre-
vious work, our work uses the permutation approach,
while all previous work use the cryptographic approach,
thus our proposal can be high efficient for the data user-
s.
4 The Second Proposal
4.1 System model
Here we describe the system model for our second pro-
posal, which is mainly for reducing the decryption over-
head of mobile users for secure access control system us-
ing attribute based encryption. The open system here
refers that the cloud can easily access the information
flow (e.g. ABE ciphertexts) in this system. In this open
system, there are four parties: the data owners, the da-
ta users, and the cloud storage service provider, and
the cloud computing service provider. The data owners
first use attribute based encryption to share the datum
with the data users via storage server, the data users are
often mobile users and need to use the cloud comput-
ing service to relieve the decryption overhead. Here the
R
etrieve data
Cloud 
Computing
Ciphertexts from attribute based 
encryption 
S
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 d
at
a
Outsource decryption
Computation result
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Storage
Fig. 5: Outsourced attributed based encryption for open
system
cloud computing service is a semi-trusted party, which
is curious about deriving the secret keys of the data
users or the decryption results.
4.2 Review of Generic Construction of Expressive
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption with
Constant-Size Ciphertexts
Attrapadung et al. construct monotonic KP-ABE with
short ciphertexts by showing a general transformation
that automatically turns any IBBE scheme fitting a cer-
tain template into a KP-ABE in the selective security
model. Here we review this generic construction.
4.2.1 Linear ID-based Broadcast Encryption Template
They define a template that IBBE schemes should com-
ply with in order to give rise to (selectively secure)
KP-ABE schemes. They call this a linear IBBE tem-
plate. Let (G,GT ) be underlying bilinear groups of or-
der p. A linear IBBE scheme is determined by parame-
ter n1, n2 ∈ N , a family F of vectors of functions, and
a function D of which the latter two are specified by
F ⊂ {f1, f2, F}|f1 : Z∗p → G, f2 : Z∗p → Gn1 ,
F : (Z∗p )
≤n−1 → G≤n2 ,
D : Gn1+2 × I ×Gn2+1 ×
(
I
< N
)
→ GT
with requirements specified below. A linear IBBE scheme
works as follows.
1. Setup(λ, n). Given a security parameter λ ∈ N and a
bound n ∈ N on the number of identities per cipher-
text, the algorithm selects bilinear groups (G,GT )
of prime order p and a generators g ← RG. It com-
putes e(g, g)α for a random α ∈ Z∗p and choos-
es functions (f1, f2, F ) ← F . The master secret
key consists of msk = gα while the public key is
mpk := (g, e(g, g)α, f1, f2, F, n, n1, n2).
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2. Keygen(msk, ID). It picks r ∈R Z∗p and computes
skID = (d1, d2, d3)
= (gα · f1(ID)r, gr, f2(ID)r) ∈ Gn1+2
3. Encrypt(mpk,M, S). It parses S as S = {ID1, · · · , IDq},
where q ≤ n. To encrypt M ∈ GT , it chooses a ran-
dom exponent s ∈R Z∗p and computes the ciphertext
as
C = (C0, C1, C2)
= (M · e(g, g)αs, gs, F (ID1, · · · , IDq)s)
4. Decrypt(mpk, skID, ID,C,S). It parses skID = (d1, d2, d3)
and C = (C0, C1, C2) then runs
D((d1, d2, d3), ID, (C1,C2),S)→ e(g, g)αs
and obtains M = C0/e(g, g)
αs. We are now ready
to state the requirements: for all (f1, f2, F ) ∈ F , the
following properties must hold
(a) Correctness. For all α, r, s ∈ Z∗p, ID ∈ I, S =
{ID1, · · · , IDq} ∈
(
I
< N
)
and ID ∈ S, We have
D((gαf1(ID)r, gr, f2(ID)r), gr, f2(ID)r)),
ID, (gs,F(ID1, · · · , IDq)s),S) = e(g, g)αs
(b) Linearity. For all γ ∈ Z∗p, ID ∈ I, S ∈ (
I
< N
), ID ∈
S, (d1, d2, d3) ∈ Gn1+2, and (C1, C2) ∈ G≤n2+1,
we have
D((d1, d2, d3)γ , ID, (C1, C2), S)
= D((d1, d2, d3), ID, (C1, C2), S)γ
4.2.2 Generic Conversion from Linear IBBE to
KP-ABE
LetΠIBBE = (Setup
′,Keygen′, Encrypt′, Decrypt′) be
a linear IBBE system. They construct a KP-ABE scheme
from ΠIBBE as follows:
1. Setup(λ, n): It simply outputs Setup′(λ, n)→ (msk,
mpk).
2. KeyGen(msk, (L, pi)): The algorithm computes a pri-
vate key for an access structure that is associated
with LSSS scheme (L, pi) as follows. Let L be l × k
matrix. First it generates shares of 1 with the LSSS
scheme (L, pi) as follows. Let L be l×k matrix. First,
it generates shares of 1 with the LSSS(L, pi). Name-
ly, it chooses a vector β = (β1, β2, · · · , βk)T ∈R
(Zp)
k subject to the constraint β1 = 1. Then for
each i = 1 to l, it calculates λi =< Li, β >, picks
r′ ∈R Zp and sets Di as follows:
Keygen′(msk, pi(i))→ (di,1, di,2, di,3)
Di = (d
λi
i,1 · f1(pi(i))r
′
, dλii,2 · gr
′
, dλii,3 · f2(pi(i))r
′
)
It then outputs the private key as
sk(L,pi) = {Di}i=1,··· ,l
3. Encrypt(mpk,M,ω): It simply outputs
Encrypt′(mpk,M,ω)→ (C0, C1, C2)
4. Decrypt(mpk, sk(L,pi), (L, pi), C, ω): Assume first that
the policy (L, pi) is satisfied by the attribute set ω, so
that decryption is possible. Let I = {i|pi(i) ∈ ω}. It
calculates the reconstruction constants {(i, ui)}i∈I =
ReconL,pi(ω). It parses C as (C0, C1, C2) and skL,pi
as {Di}i=1,··· ,l where Di = (d′i,1, d′i,2, d′i,3). For each
i ∈ I, it computes
D((d′i,1, d′i,2, d′i,3), ID, (C1, C2), S)→ e(g, g)α·s·λi
(1)
which we prove correctness below. It compute e(g, g)αs =∏
i∈I(e(g, g)
αsλi)ui and finally obtainsM = C0e(g,g)αs ,
where we recall that Σi∈Iλiui = 1.
Correctness. They now verify that equation (1) is
correct. First from a property of keys in linear IBBE,
we have that (di,1, di,2, di,3) will be in the form (g
α ·
f1(pi(i))
ri , gri , f2(pi(i))
ri) for some ri ∈R Z∗p. Therefore
we have
Di = (g
αλi ·f1(pi(i))r¯λi , gr¯λi , f2(pi(i))i¯λi) = (dλi1 , dλi2 , dλi3 )
with r¯i = ri + r
′/λi and (d1, d2, d3) = skpi(i) with ran-
domness r¯i. Hence
D((d′i,1, d′i,2, d′i,3), ID, (C1, C2), S)
= D((d1, d2, d3), ID, (C1, C2), S)λi
= (e(g, g)α·s)λi
where each equality holds from linearity and correctness
of D respectively.
The authors also give the security theorem of the
above generic construction:
Theorem 2 If the underlying IBBE scheme is selec-
tively secure, then the resulting KP-ABE system is also
selectively secure.
4.2.3 IBBE Instantiation with Short Ciphertexts
This subsection presents an IBBE scheme with short
ciphertexts and shows how to apply the KP-ABE con-
version. This specific IBBE can be seen as an instance of
the functional encryption (FE) for zero inner-product,
which itself is implied by spatial encryption of [10]. A
FE system for zero inner- product is defined by a rela-
tion RZIP : Zp × Zp → {0, 1} where RZIP (X,Y ) = 1
if < X,Y >= 0. The technique of deriving an IBBE
scheme from a FE scheme for zero inner-product can
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be traced to [23]. A private key for an identity ID is
defined by setting X = (x1, · · · , xn)T , with xi = IDi−1.
To encrypt to a set S = {ID1, · · · , IDq}, one defines
Y = (y1, · · · , yn)T as a coefficient vector from
PS [Z] = Σ
q+1
i=1 yiZ
i−1 =
∏
IDj∈S
(Z − IDj)
(2)
where, if q + 1 ≤ n, the coordinates yq+2, · · · , yn are
set to 0. By doing so, we note that PS [ID] =< X,Y >
evaluates to 0 iff ID ∈ S. We now describe the IBBE
instantiated from the FE system of [4]. Its selective se-
curity is an immediate consequence of [4], where it is
proved under the DBDHE assumption.
1. Setup(λ, n): It chooses bilinear groups (G,GT ) of
prime order p ≥ 2λ with g ←R G. It randomly
chooses α, α0 ∈ Zp, α = (α1, · · · , αn)T ←R Znp .
It then sets H = (h1, · · · , hn)T = gα. The mas-
ter secret key is msk = α, and the public key is
mpk = (g, e(g, g)α, h0 = g
α0 , H = gα).
2. KeyGen(msk, ID): The algorithm first defines a vec-
tor X = {x1, · · · , xn}T such that xi = IDi−1 for
i = 1 to n. It chooses r ∈R Zp and outputs the
private key skID = (D1, D2,K2, · · · ,Kn) where
D1 = g
α · hr0, D2 = gr, {Ki = (h
−xi
x1
1 )
r}i=2,··· ,n
3. Encrypt(mpk,M, S): To encrypt M to the receiv-
er set S (where |S| ≤ n), the algorithm defines
Y = (y1, y2, · · · , yn)T as the coefficient vector of
PS [Z] from equation (2). It then picks s ←R Zp
and computes the ciphertext as
C = (C0, C1, C2) = (M ·e(g, g)αs, gs, (h0·hy1 · · ·hynn )s)
4. Decrypt(mpk, skID, ID,C,S): It defines the vector Y =
(y1, · · · , yn)T from the polynomial PS [Z] as usual.
It then computes
e(g, g)αs =
e(C1, D1 ·Ky22 · · ·Kynn )
e(C2, D2)
and recovers M = C0e(g,g)αs .
Correctness. If < X,Y >= 0, then decryption recov-
ers M since
D1 ·
n∏
i=2
Kyii = g
α(h0 · h
− 1x1 (<X,Y >−x1y1)
1
n∏
i=2
hyii )
r
= gα(h0 ·
n∏
i=1
hyii )
r
so that e(C1, D1·
∏n
i=1K
yi
i ) = e(g, g)
αs·e(h0
∏n
i=1 h
yi
i , g
rs)
equals the product e(g, g)αs · e(C2, D2).
Applying the KP-ABE Conversion. The above IBBE
can be considered as a linear IBBE system with n1 =
n − 1, n2 = 1 and the family F is defined by tak-
ing all functions of the following forms ranging over
h0, h1, · · · , hn ∈ G:
f1(ID) = h0, f2(ID)
= (h−ID1 h2, · · · , h−ID
n−1
1 hn), F (ID1, · · · , IDq)
= h0
q+1∏
i=1
hyii
where the vector Y = {y1, · · · , yn)T is defined from
the polynomial PS [Z] in equation (2) as usual. In addi-
tion, the function D is the computation in equation (3),
which can be show to have linearity as required. The
resulting KP-ABE has constant-size ciphertexts. This
comes with the expense of longer private keys of size
O(tn), where t is the number of attributes in the access
structure.
4.3 Our Proposal
Here we give a generic construction just like the above
transformation: LetΠIBBE = (Setup
′,Keygen′, Encrypt′,
Decrypt′) be a linear IBBE system. Then we construct
an efficient outsourcing KP-ABE scheme with energy
efficiency from ΠIBBE as follows:
1. Setup(λ, n): It simply outputs Setup′(λ, n)→ (msk,mpk).
2. KeyGen(msk, (L, pi)): The algorithm computes a pri-
vate key for an access structure that is associated
with LSSS scheme (L, pi) as follows. Let L be l × k
matrix. First it generates shares of 1 with the LSSS
scheme (L, pi) as follows. Let L be l×k matrix. First,
it generates shares of 1 with the LSSS(L, pi). Name-
ly, it chooses a vector β = (β1, β2, · · · , βk)T ∈R
(Zp)
k subject to the constraint β1 = 1. Then for
each i = 1 to l, it calculates λi =< Li, β >, picks
r′ ∈R Zp and sets Di as follows:
Keygen′(msk, pi(i))→ (di,1, di,2, di,3)
Di = (d
λi
i,1 · f1(pi(i))r
′
, dλii,2 · gr
′
, dλii,3 · f2(pi(i))r
′
)
It then outputs the private key as sk(L,pi) = {Di}i=1,··· ,l.
3. Outsourcing KeyGen(sk(L,pi), T emp): This algorithm
computes the outsourcing private key for data us-
er. After input the secret key sk(L,pi) and a random
Temp ∈ Z∗p which acts as the key to mask the re-
al secret key, this algorithm outputs the outsourced
secret key skoutsource(L,pi) for this data user
D
1
Temp
i = ((d
λi
i,1 · f1(pi(i))r
′
)
1
Temp ,
(dλii,2 · gr
′
)
1
Temp ,
(dλii,3 · f2(pi(i))r
′
)
1
Temp )
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The data user preserves Temp for final decryption.
4. Encrypt(mpk,M,ω): It simply outputs Encrypt′(mpk,
M,ω)→ (C0, C1, C2).
5. Outsourcing Decrypt(mpk, sk(L,pi), (L, pi), C, ω): As-
sume first that the policy (L, pi) is satisfied by the at-
tribute set ω, so that decryption is possible. Let I =
{i|pi(i) ∈ ω}. The cloud calculates the reconstruc-
tion constants {(i, ui)}i∈I = ReconL,pi(ω). It parses
C as (C0, C1, C2) and sk
outsource
L,pi as {D
1
Temp
i }i=1,··· ,l
where D
1
Temp
i = ((d
′
i,1)
1
Temp , (d′i,2)
1
Temp , (d′i,3)
1
Temp ).
For each i ∈ I, it computes
D(((d′i,1)
1
Temp , (d′i,2)
1
Temp , (d′i,3)
1
Temp ), ID,
(C1, C2), S)→ e(g, g)
α·s·λi
Temp
(3)
which we prove correctness below. It compute
TempDecrypt = e(g, g)
αs
Temp
=
∏
i∈I
(e(g, g)
α·s·λi
Temp )ui
where we recall that Σi∈Iλiui = 1.
6. Decrypt(TempDecrypt, Temp): On inputs TempDecrypt
and Temp, this algorithm finally obtains e(g, g)αs =
TempDecryptTemp = (e(g, g)
αs
Temp )Temp and thus
M = C0e(g,g)αs .
Correctness. We can verify that equation (3) is cor-
rect. First from a property of keys in linear IBBE,
we have that (di,1, di,2, di,3) will be in the form (g
α ·
f1(pi(i))
ri , gri , f2(pi(i))
ri) for some ri ∈R Z∗p. Therefore
we have
Di = (g
αλi ·f1(pi(i))r¯λi , gr¯λi , f2(pi(i))i¯λi) = (dλi1 , dλi2 , dλi3 )
with r¯i = ri + r
′/λi and (d1, d2, d3) = skpi(i) with ran-
domness r¯i. Hence
D(((d′i,1)
1
Temp , (d′i,2)
1
Temp , (d′i,3)
1
Temp ), ID, (C1, C2), S)
= D((d1, d2, d3), ID, (C1, C2), S)
λi
Temp
= (e(g, g)α·s)
λi
Temp
where each equality holds from linearity and correct-
ness of D respectively. And the correctness of Decrypt
algorithm follows easily. Our technique is same as [14]
4.4 Security Analysis
We have the following security theorem on our proposal
(denoted as KP-OABE):
Theorem 3 If the underlying IBBE scheme is selec-
tively secure, then so is the resulting KP-OABE sys-
tem. More precisely, for any selective-set adversary A
against the KP-OABE construction, there is an IND-
sID-CPA adversary B against the IBBE scheme and we
have:
AdvIBBE−sID−CPAB (λ) ≥ AdvKP−OABE−sCPAA (λ)
More concretely, our KP-ABE scheme with outsourced
decryption is selectively CPA-secure assuming that the
scheme of Attrapdung [4] is an selectively CPA-secure
IBBE scheme.
Proof We construct a simple IND-sID-CPA adversary
B against the IBBE scheme assuming that a selective-
set attacker A has non-negligible advantage against the
KP-OABE system. Namely, B plays the role of As chal-
lenger and interacts with his own challenger in the IBBE
security game. Here, we call the challenger of IBBE as
CI .
The game begins with our KP-OABE adversary A
choosing an attribute set ω∗ that intends to attack. The
Attrapdung IBBE adversary B then announces S∗ =
{i ∈ ω∗} as her target set of receivers. The system-wide
Attrapdung IBBE public key that B receives from her
challenger are relayed to A as system-wide parameters
for the our KP-OABE scheme.
1. Init. KP-OABE adversary A chooses the set of at-
tribute set ω∗ it wishes to be challenged upon and
sends to B.
2. Setup. The challenger CI computes the public key
MPK = (g, e(g, g)α, f1, f2, F, n, n1, n2) and sends
these to the adversary A.
3. Phase 1. In this phase the simulator B answers the
following queries by A. And B constructs the corre-
sponding key tableQ, then it answers the adversarys
queries as follows:
Amay ask for the private key of any access structure
(L, pi) such that ω∗ does not satisfy (L, pi). To an-
swer such a query, let Lω∗ be the sub-matrix formed
by the rows of L that correspond to an attribute in
ω∗. Since 1 = (1, 0, · · · , 0)T is not in the row space
of Lω∗ , there must exist an efficiently computable
vector w such that Lω∗ · w = 0 and < 1, w >6= 0.
Let h denote the value of < 1, w > 6= 0. Let h denote
the value < 1, w >. To construct a private key, B has
to define a vector u = a · β such that . B implicitly
sets u as u = v+ψ ·w, where v = (v1, · · · , vk)T is a
randomly chosen vector and ψ = (α−v1)/h, so that
(1, w) = α. To generate triples (Di,1, Di,2, Di,3) for
each row of L, B proceeds as follows:
(a) Let Γ1 = {j ∈ {1, · · · , l}|pi(j) ∈ ω∗}. For each
j ∈ Γ1, if ΓT1 = (mj1, · · · ,mjk) denotes the
jth row of L, we have < Lj ,u >=< Lj ,u >=∑k
t1=1
mjt1vt1 and the share λj =< Lj ,u > is
thus computable, so that B can pick integers
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λj , rj ∈R Z∗p and define (Dj = Dj,1, Dj,2, Dj,3) =
(gλj · f1(pi(j))rj , grj , f2(pi(j))rj ). B calls the the
IBBE key generation oracle on (L, pi) to obtain
the private key skL,pi. Then B chooses a random
value Temp ∈ Z∗p and sets the outsourced se-
cret key skoutsourceL,pi as D
1/Temp
j . Finally B stores
(skL,pi, sk
outsource
L,pi , T emp) in table Q.
(b) Let Γ2 = {j ∈ {1, · · · , l}|pi(j) /∈ ω∗}. For each
j ∈ Γ2, B is allowed to query its own challenger
CI to extract
(dj,1, dj,2, dj,3)←
∏
IBBE
Keygen(msk, pi(j))
We have < Lj ,u >=< Lj ,v > +ψ < Li, w¯ >=∑k
t1=1
mjt1
(
vt1 +
α−v1
h ωt1
)
= µ1α + µ2 where
the coefficients µ1 = (
∑k
t1=1
mjt1wt1) · h−1 and
µ2 = h
−1∑k
t1=1
mjt1wt1(hvt1 − v1wt1) are both
computable, so that B can obtain a well-formed
triple
Dj = (Dj,1, Dj,2, Dj,3)
= (dµ1j,1g
µ2f1(pi(j))
r′j , dµ1j,2 · gr
′
j , dµ1j,2 · gr
′
j ,
dµ1j,3 · f(pi(j))r
′
j )
B calls the the IBBE key generation oracle on
(L, pi) to obtain the private key sk(L, pi). Then,
B chooses a random value Temp′ ∈ Z∗p and set-
s the outsourced secret key (sk′(L,pi))
outsource as
D
1
Temp′
j . Finally, B stores
(sk′(L,pi), (sk
′
(L,pi))
outsource, T emp)
in table Q.
4. Challenge. The adversaryA submits two equal length
messages M0, M1 and attribute S to B to obtain
the challenge ciphertext CT ∗. Then, B sends the
M0,M1 to CI before relaying the challenge cipher-
texts back to A.
5. Phase 2. The adversary A continues to adaptively
queries as in Phase 1, but with the restriction that
the adversary cannot violate the constraint on the
challenge attribute S. B responds the queries as in
Phase 1. And B eventually outputs the same result
σ ∈ {0, 1} as A does. It is easy to see that B never
has to query her challenger to extract the private
key for an identity of the target attribute set S∗ =
ω∗.
6. Guess. Eventually, A outputs a bit β′, then B out-
puts β′. This ends the description of the simulation.
Thus, if A has advantage  in the selective security
game against our scheme, then B breaks the IBBE
scheme with the same probability. It comes that B
is successful whenever A is so, this ends our proof.
4.5 A New Way to Outsource the Decryption Key
with Only One Modular Exponentiation Cost
Here we give a new way for secure efficient outsourc-
ing the decryptor’s decryption key for KP-ABE, which
only cost one modular exponentiation, concretely the
outsourced KP-ABE scheme is the following:
1. Setup(λ, n): It simply outputs
Setup′(λ, n)→ (msk,mpk)
2. KeyGen(msk, (L, pi)): The algorithm computes a pri-
vate key for an access structure that is associated
with LSSS scheme (L, pi) as follows. Let L be l × k
matrix. First it generates shares of 1 with the LSSS
scheme (L, pi) as follows. Let L be l × k matrix.
It chooses a vector β = (β1, β2, · · · , βk)T ∈R (Zp)k
subject to the constraint β1 = 1. Then for each i = 1
to l, it calculates λi =< Li, β >, picks r
′ ∈R Zp and
sets Di as follows:
Keygen′(msk, pi(i))→ (di,1, di,2, di,3)
Di = (d
λi
i,1 · f1(pi(i))r
′
, dλii,2 · gr
′
, dλii,3 · f2(pi(i))r
′
)
It then outputs the private key as sk(L,pi) = {Di}i=1,··· ,l.
3. Outsourcing KeyGen(sk(L,pi), z): This algorithm com-
putes the outsourcing private key for data user. Af-
ter input the secret key sk(L,pi) and a random z ∈ Z∗p
which acts as the key to mask the real secret key,
this algorithm outputs the outsourced secret key
skoutsource(L,pi) for this data user
Doutsourcei =
((dλii,1 · f1(pi(i))r
′
) · gz, (dλii,2 · gr
′
) · gz, (dλii,3 · f2(pi(i))r
′
) · gz)
The data user preserves z for final decryption.
4. Encrypt(mpk,M,ω): It simply outputs
Encrypt′(mpk,M,ω)→ (C0, C1, C2)
5. Outsourcing Decrypt(mpk, sk(L,pi), (L, pi), C, ω): As-
sume first that the policy (L, pi) is satisfied by the
attribute set ω, so that decryption is possible. Let
I = {i|pi(i) ∈ ω}. The cloud calculates the recon-
struction constants {(i, ui)}i∈I = ReconL,pi(ω). It
parses C as (C0, C1, C2) and sk
outsource
L,pi as ((d
′
i,1) ·
gz, (d′i,2) · gz, (d′i,3) · gz). For each i ∈ I, it computes
Xi = D(((d′i,1) · gz, (d′i,2) · gz, (d′i,3) · gz), ID, (C1, C2), S)
(4)
Yi = D((g, g, g), ID, (C1, C2), S)
(5)
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which we prove correctness below. It compute
TempDecrypt1 =
∏
i∈I
(e(g, g)α·s·λi(Y zi ))
ui
and TempDecrypt2 =
∏
i∈I(Yi)
ui where we recall
that Σi∈Iλiui = 1.
6. Decrypt(TempDecrypt1, TempDecrypt2, z): On in-
puts TempDecrypt1, TempDecrypt2, z, this algo-
rithm finally obtains e(g, g)αs = TempDecrypt1TempDecryptz2
and
thus M = C0e(g,g)αs .
Correctness. We can verify that equation (3) is cor-
rect. First from a property of keys in linear IBBE,
we have that (di,1, di,2, di,3) will be in the form (g
α ·
f1(pi(i))
ri , gri , f2(pi(i))
ri) for some ri ∈R Z∗p. Therefore
we have
Di = (g
αλi ·f1(pi(i))r¯λi , gr¯λi , f2(pi(i))i¯λi) = (dλi1 , dλi2 , dλi3 )
with r¯i = ri + r
′/λi and (d1, d2, d3) = skpi(i) with ran-
domness r¯i. Hence
D((gz, gz, gz), ID, (C1, C2), S)
= D((g, g, g), ID, (C1, C2), S)z
where each equality holds from linearity and correct-
ness of D respectively. And the correctness of Decrypt
algorithm follows easily. Security. Here we roughly anal-
ysis the security of this proposal. The main difference
between this proposal and the above one is this: in Out-
sourcing KeyGen algorithm, the outsourced key is
Doutsourcei =
((dλii,1 · f1(pi(i))r
′
) · gz, (dλii,2 · gr
′
) · gz, (dλii,3 · f2(pi(i))r
′
) · gz)
For z is unknown to the adversary, thus the adversary
can not easily derive the real decryption key.
4.6 Feature and Performance Analysis
4.6.1 Feature Comparison
Table 2: Comparison Result
Proposals Constant Ciphertext Length Verifiability Contribution
[14] No No First OD-ABE
[15] No Yes First OD-ABE-V
[19] No Yes First OD/E/K-ABE-V
[22] No Yes Efficient OD-ABE-V
Ours Yes No Efficient OD-C-ABE
In this subsection, we compare our work with the
previous work, with the emphasis on the ciphertex-
t length. OD-ABE denotes outsourcing decryption of
ABE, OD-ABE-V denotes outsourcing decryption of
ABE with verifiability, OD/E/K-ABE-V denotes out-
sourcing decryption/encryption/key generation of ABE
with verifiability, OD-C-ABE denotes outsourcing de-
cryption of ABE with constant ciphertexts. We also
note our scheme can easily achieve verifiability proper-
ty by adapting the technique presenting in [22], which
is the most efficient one until now. From the above ta-
ble, we can see our proposal is the most energy efficient
scheme for mobile users when outsourcing the decryp-
tion of attribute based encryption to the cloud, which
will has important applications for mobile users, while
this is a more and more common setting in our life.
4.6.2 Performance Analysis
We roughly evaluate the performance of our second pro-
posal. According to the benchmark of JPBC, based on
the testbed3 which with the following hardware plat-
forms: HTC Desire HD A9191, Android 2.2 (Java Port)
[27], we give the comparison results between Green et
al.’s scheme [14] and our scheme, which can be seen in
Table II, III, IV and Fig. 6, 7, 8, 9. These performance
evaluation results show our second proposal is practical.
Table 3: ABE Ciphertext Size (Kbytes)
Scheme/Number of Attributes 20 40 60 80 100
GHW [14] 1.385 2.645 3.905 5.165 6.425
Ours 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188
Table 4: Outsourcing KeygenTime(seconds)
Scheme/Number of Attributes 20 40 60 80 100
GHW [14] 0.118 0.176 0.234 0.292 0.350
Our first way 4.3 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089
Our another new way4.5 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029
Table 5: Final Decryption time (seconds)
Scheme/Number of Attributes 20 40 60 80 100
Ours 0.0198 0.0198 0.0198 0.0198 0.0198
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the issue of outsourcing de-
cryption of ABE for mobile devices with energy effi-
ciency. We give two proposals. The first one is based
on a novel permutation technique for access structure
and attributes, which can be used for self-enclosed sys-
tem. The second one is based on ABE schemes with
14 J.Zhang et al.
Fig. 6: ABE cipertext size comparison
Fig. 7: Outsourcing keygen time comparison
Fig. 8: Final decryption time
constant ciphertexts for mobile users in the cloud set-
ting. We propose a generic construction for outsourced
ABE based on Attrapadung et al. generic construction
of ABE. We think the ciphertext length is an impor-
tant issue for outsourcing for it directly affect the bat-
tery’s energy consuming, the more shorter the cipher-
texts are, the more surviving time the mobile phones
can support. However, we also note our result is very
basic, many open problems are leaving such as prov-
ing proposing outsourcing decryption of ABE candi-
dates with constant ciphertexts and constant private
Fig. 9: Outsourcing keygen time comparison between
GHW and our new way
keys etc, extending the idea of permutation technique
to ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption etc.
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